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Abstract 
 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a popular business concept 
in developed economies. As typical of other business concepts, it is on its way to 
globalization through practices and structures of the globalized capitalist world order, typified 
in Multinational Corporations (MNCs). However, CSR often sits uncomfortably in this 
capitalist world order, as MNCs are often challenged by the global reach of their supply 
chains and the possible irresponsible practices inherent along these chains. The possibility 
of irresponsible practices puts global firms under pressure to protect their brands even if it 
means assuming responsibilities for the practices of their suppliers. Pressure groups 
understand this burden on firms and try to take advantage of the situation. This paper seeks 
to challenge the often taken-for-granted-assumption that firms should be accountable for the 
practices of their suppliers by espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) underpinnings of 
the concept of responsibility. Except where corporate control and or corporate grouping 
exist, it identifies the use of power as a critical factor to be considered in allocating 
responsibility in firm-supplier relationship; and suggests that the more powerful in this 
relationship has a responsibility to exert some moral influence on the weaker party. The 
paper highlights the use of code of conducts, corporate culture, anti-pressure group 
campaigns, personnel training and value reorientation as possible sources of wielding 
positive moral influence along supply chains. 
 
Key words: Responsibility, firm-supplier relationship, purchasing ethics, responsible supply 
chain management, corporate control and corporate group 
 
   Page 2 of 21
Introduction 
 
The stakeholder theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) emphasises a much broader 
set of social responsibilities for business. Stakeholders, as used in this theory, refer to those 
individuals or groups who may affect or are affected by the organisation (Freeman, 1984 and 
1994; Clarkson, 1995). They include a wide variety of interests, and as suggested by Mullins 
(2002), may be grouped under six main headings: employees, shareholders, consumers, 
government, community and the environment, as well as groups such as suppliers, trade 
unions, business associates and even competitors. In this regard, CSR can be broadly 
defined as an organisation’s commitment to operate in an economically and environmentally 
sustainable manner while recognising the interests of its stakeholders1.  
 
In line with this broader definition of CSR, global brands like Nike, GAP, Adidas and 
McDonalds are often under intense pressure from groups working for responsible supply 
chain management. Much of this pressure is channelled through the supply chain, since the 
pressure groups sometimes find it difficult to reach the global brands directly. To this end, 
they rely on indirect tactics such as targeting the sourcing activities of these brands and their 
seeming exploitation of cheap labour conditions in developing countries. These attacks, 
which have been quite successful in recent times, hack on the reputation of these firms (e.g. 
Nike’s case2). They engender negative public sentiments and invariably resentments 
towards the global brands following “irresponsible” behaviours along their supply chain. 
These negative perceptions of firms persist, irrespective of the locus of the “guilty” suppliers 
on the supply chain spectrum of the primary purchasing firm. This image tends to put firms 
under pressure to bear indefinite responsibilities for their wide and long supplier networks. 
Firms, therefore, do everything possible to protect their brands – including accounting for the 
seeming irresponsible behaviours of their suppliers, as shown in the current wave of social 
reports across industries.  
 
There seems to be widespread agreement on some form of corporate responsibility for 
social issues. Nevertheless, the critical question is how to define or limit the scope of such 
responsibility within the context of the operations of MNCs. The enormity of corporate 
multinational power makes this an urgent and important task. The general conception of 
corporate social responsibility is extra-legal (McWilliams and Siegel 2001). Apart from 
corporate social responsibility reports, firms including MNCs now appear to adhere to one 
                                                 
1 http://www.cbsr.bc.ca/what_is_csr/index.cfm  visited on April 8, 2003 
2 Nike and its subcontractors are often accused of inhumane labour and business practices in Asian factories 
where Nike products are made. See: Kasky v. Nike and its Implications for CSR 
http://www.csrpolicies.org/CSRResources/CSRBriefs/csrbriefs_nike.html visited May 26, 2004 
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code of conduct or the other. These codes are usually voluntary initiatives by the firms, 
either alone or in association with other firms in the same or similar industry. Sometimes, 
other participants such as pressure groups and civil societies make input to the contents of 
such codes.  However, most corporate codes of conduct have not properly addressed the 
issue of defining the limit of corporate responsibility for the activities of another corporation. 
For instance, The Apparel Industry Code of Conduct for US-based clothing and accessories 
corporations imposes a “duty” on such enterprises to ensure compliance with the code by 
their contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers and licensees.3 This is clearly a nebulous 
obligation. Does this “duty” extend to all the levels and actors in the supply chain, 
irrespective of proximity or remoteness from the firm or MNC? Can the “duty” be applied to a 
situation where the MNC is not even in a position to control or influence a “member” of the 
supply chain? Is unlimited exposure to social responsibility a good idea for the business 
environment? How does social responsibility fit in with the concepts of corporate legal 
personality and independent existence of corporations? Is reconciliation possible? 
 
One of the negative consequences of this pressure approach towards CSR adopted by 
pressure groups is the tendency to (inadvertently) promote the false notion that CSR 
practice is restricted only to global big firms and brands. Since most of the firms along the 
supply chains are likely to be SMEs, this approach also exhibits the tendency of giving an 
inaccurate impression that SMEs are somehow shielded from engaging in CSR practices, 
which runs against the ethos of the CSR movement. In the contrary, there is a rising call for 
SMEs to participate in both CSR discourse and practice as well (Petts, 1998; Spence, 1999; 
Sarbutts, 2003).  This is where and why we think that arguing for and highlighting the limits 
of CSR practices along supply chains of global brands could be a way to curtail the 
excesses of pressure groups and their antics, as well as extend the reach of the call for 
SMEs to be equally socially responsible. 
 
This paper, therefore, examines if firms should be responsible for the practices of their 
suppliers, the extent of this responsibility and how they could effectively translate such 
responsibilities, if any, into practice. The paper starts by situating firm-supplier relationships 
within the broader context of firm buying behaviour; and from that context evaluates the 
responsibilities of firms as ‘customers’ to their suppliers – often times, this point that 
purchasing firms are customers is ignored in debates around responsible supply chain 
management. The paper does not focus on such ethical issues in purchasing as: deception, 
bribery, price rigging, unsafe products and public safety (Wood, 1996:185) since these are 
                                                 
3 Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry including Footwear, available at: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/ccccode.htm  [visited August 8, 2006] 
   Page 4 of 21
likely to arise from the internal environment of the purchasing firm and not necessarily from 
its relationship with the suppliers. In addition, it does not consider the intricacies of the 
economic dynamics characteristic of firm-supplier relationships. It focuses solely on 
espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) connotations of the concept of responsibility and 
what it means to be held responsible while relating these to firm-supplier relationships. In the 
main, the paper attempts to set limits to responsibility in a supplier relationship by 
introducing the concepts of corporate control and corporate grouping as critical factors.  
 
Responsibility as accountability: meaning, clarifications and 
exceptions 
 
From ancient times, philosophers have struggled to unravel the wealth of meanings 
embedded in the term ‘responsibility’ or the expression ‘to be held responsible’. The term 
and the expression are both associated with the concept of morality. This is not surprising, 
since the claim of morally responsible agents is one of the distinguishing characteristics of 
human rationality (Eshleman, 2002).  A comprehensive account of the philosophy of 
responsibility, thus, encapsulates nuances of moral responsibility, the status of a moral 
agent and the conditions under which the actions of a moral agent may be considered 
responsible or irresponsible.   
 
In the history of western philosophy, substantive reflections on the notion of moral 
responsibility date back to the ancient Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle. In 
Nichomachean Ethics (BKIII), Aristotle assumes the criteria for moral agency to include the 
capacity for rational choice and deliberation.  A responsible act is a voluntary act. Therefore, 
an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy depending on his or her voluntary acts and 
disposition of character traits. For an act to qualify as a voluntary act, the agent must be both 
in full control of his or her action and must be rationally cognizant of the consequences of his 
or her action. Involuntary acts are thus those acts for which the agent should not be held 
responsible, either because they are executed out of ignorance, external coercion or to avoid 
a greater evil (Cahn 2002).  However, contemporary western moral philosophy embodies 
varying and often conflicting notions of moral responsibility. While the neo-Kantian variants 
are deontological in nature, utilitarian offshoots of the ethics of moral responsibility are often 
consequentialist.  
 
The Kantian idea of moral responsibility also stems from the conception of person as a moral 
agent. A moral agent or person is not only rational or capable of rational choice, but is one 
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whose action is informed by a sense of duty. The sense of duty is codified in universal law 
principles, which Kant referred to as categorical imperatives. Therefore, a responsible or 
right action is not necessarily one that maximizes utility, but one that follows moral principles, 
which are capable of becoming universal moral laws (Cahn 2002:752). Hence, for neo-
Kantians and some other deontologists a responsible or good moral agent ought to act in 
accordance with good moral principles, irrespective of the consequences of such actions. 
The assumption here is that good moral principles lead to actions that invariably bring about 
good consequences. For consequentialists, however, a good or responsible action is one 
that brings about good consequences or maximizes utility (in the case of utilitarianism). 
Hence, the morality of an act is not dependent on moral principles prior to the action, but on 
the actual outcome of a particular act.   
 
In another sense, to be responsible may involve some sort of cause and effect relationship 
(e.g. gravity responsible for the fall of objects in space) or carry some sort of duties and or 
obligations which could be legal and moral (e.g. an employed school teacher’s responsibility 
to teach). Since “…to be morally [and legally] responsible for something, say an action, is to 
be worthy of a particular kind of reaction – praise, blame [punishment] or something akin to 
these – for having performed it” (Eshleman, 2002:1), the latter applies more to our 
arguments in this paper than the former. Dwelling on the meaning of responsibility, the 
philosopher John Lucas (1993) wrote: 
 
Etymologically, to be responsible is to be answerable—it comes from the 
Latin respondeo, I answer, or the French répondre, as in RSVP. I can 
equally well say that I am answerable for an action or accountable for it. 
And if I am to answer, I must answer a question; the question is 'Why did 
you do it?' and in answering that question, I give an account [...] of my 
action. So the central core of the concept of responsibility is that I can be 
asked the question 'Why did you do it?' and be obliged to give an answer. 
 
In a similar effort, Craig (2000) defines ‘responsibility’ as follows: 
 
To be responsible for something is to be answerable for it. We have 
prospective responsibilities, things it is up to us to attend to: these may 
attach to particular roles (the responsibilities of, for instance, parents or 
doctors), or the responsibilities we have as moral agents, or as human 
beings. We have retrospective responsibilities, for what we have done or 
failed to do, for the effects of our actions or omissions. Such 
responsibilities are often (but not always) moral or legal responsibilities.  
 
However, can one be answerable for an action that lies beyond one’s control? What if one’s 
psychological and physical conditions do not permit one to give an account of one’s actions, 
who should be accountable in this case? These questions raise the fundamental challenges 
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of fatalism and determinism in relation to the concept of “responsibility” and are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
Responsibility in the sense used in this paper is closely related to the concept of 
accountability. Drawing from the works of other academics (e.g. Gray et al. 1987; Williams 
1987; Roberts and Scapens, 1985), Swift (2001:17) characterizes accountability in both 
broad and narrow sense. Broadly speaking, he describes accountability as "... the 
requirement or duty to provide an account or justification for one's actions to whomever one 
is answerable". In a narrow sense, Swift talks of accountability as "... being pertinent to 
contractual arrangements only,... where accountability is not contractually bound there can 
be no act of accountability". Furthermore, borrowing from a later work of Gray et al (1997), 
Swift notes that "... essentially accountability is about the provision of information between 
two parties where the one is accountable, explains or justifies actions to the one to whom the 
account is owed". This form of accountability underlies principal-agent relationship, which is 
central to the firm as an economic and legal entity. Despite the presence of semantic 
variations within the notion of accountability, the duty to account appears to convey a central 
meaning. The duty to account connotes institution of rights and obligations and as such, 
should be able to hurt if violated (Owen et al., 2000).  
 
In the same line of thought, Gray et al. (1988) explain that a firm's accountability to the wider 
society is inherent in a social contract between the society and the business group. The 
appropriation of the social contract theory here stems from the hypothesis that 
business derives its existence from the society. Although traditional social contract theories 
are hypothetical constructs, nevertheless, they are normative reference points in the 
justification of the legal use of coercive state or societal power on individual citizens and 
corporations. This idea of accountability inherent in the social contract is realized when 
market forces punish or reward corporate behaviour (Swift, 2001; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). In this regard, Korten (2004) argues that the market by necessity needs information to 
be effective. Hence, corporations have the moral duty to produce necessary and complete 
information needed by the market to mete out punishment or dispense reward. This will 
constitute accountability to the market, which cannot be achieved through self-regulation. 
 
The increasing demand for accountability from firms also extends to the activities within their 
supply chain (Mamic, 2005). This extension of responsibility, in itself, is questionable: Is the 
supply chain of a firm intrinsically part of the firm? If it is, what becomes of the independence 
of the individual firms operating within a primary firm’s supply chain? If it is not, is it 
appropriate to expect firms to account for actions outside their legal boundaries, thereby 
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exposing them to “unlimited” responsibility for their supply chains? Why should one firm bear 
responsibilities for the practices of another firm? Are ‘consumers’ responsible for the 
practices of the firms (e.g. supermarkets) they buy from? Are suppliers (in our case the 
supermarkets) not pressured to be responsible and ethical to the consumers at the micro-
level (individual buying behaviour)? These questions assume more challenging postures, 
especially in cases where relationships between firms and the suppliers are fundamentally 
economic and at arms length (Sako, 1992). As such, we see the apparent ascription of 
unlimited responsibility to account for suppliers’ practices on the purchasing firms as 
inappropriate because it undermines corporate autonomy and independence.  
 
In most legal systems, a corporation is recognised as a legal person. The principle of 
independent legal existence of a corporation recognises that a corporation is distinct from its 
members or shareholders. A corporation is regarded as neither an arm nor an extension of 
its members or shareholders. In Dartmouth College v Woodward a corporation was 
described as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
law”. Corporate personality is now an established principle in most legal systems. Various 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, for instance, Santa Clara County v Southern 
P.R. Co (1886), First National Bank v Belotti (1978), consistently confirmed the legal 
personality of corporations. Furthermore, the twin principles of corporate personality and 
separate legal existence of a corporation are the “…cornerstone of English company law 
[and] a fundamental rule” (McGee et al., 2005:99). An important component of these twin 
principles is the principle of limited liability under which the liability of the shareholders or 
members of a corporation is limited only to the value of their shareholding (Salomon v 
Salomon & Co.: 1897). In other words, it could be argued that the supply chain is not an 
extension of the firm and as such, the purchasing firm should not bear any responsibilities 
for the practices of its suppliers. Suppliers, as firms, should bear responsibility for their 
actions. However, these are the general legal rules. In practice, there are exceptions to the 
general rules - for example, where there are some sorts of integrations – i.e. vertical or 
horizontal and even network – between the purchasing and supplying firms.  To substantiate 
our argument for these exceptions, we draw insights from two related concepts in law – (a) 
control as limitation of corporate liability and (b) corporate group. These two concepts are, 
practically, exceptions to the twin principles of corporate legal personality and separate 
existence of a corporation. 
 
 
Control 
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Relevant statutes usually contain their definitions of control (e.g. section 231 of the UK 
Employment Rights Act, 1996). Corporate control may exist in various forms. For example, 
where the management of one corporation can be appointed or removed by the 
management of another corporation, control appears to be in existence. In a situation, where 
a corporation has no assets at all or has no assets within its area of operation and relies on 
the assets of the other corporation to do business, or where a corporation engaged in a 
“risky” venture sells its assets to a corporation in the same group (as happened in Patrick 
Case: Spender, 2000: 38-43), corporate control may exist here too. The Australian Patrick 
Case illustrates this point. In that case, four members of a stevedoring group sold their 
business and other assets to another member of the group. The only asset left in each of the 
selling companies was a contract to supply labour to an upstream company in the same 
group. The upstream company later terminated this contract for supply of labour. The 
termination of that contract directly resulted in the insolvency of the four companies. 
 
However, prior to the group restructuring, each member of the group employed its own 
workers, owned and operated its own stevedoring business. It was later pointed out that the 
main reason for the restructuring exercise was to “facilitate the termination of the employees’ 
employment” (Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia 
(1998): 673; Spender, 2000:40). One other important result of the restructuring was that that 
same individual became the sole director of each of the four labour-supply companies. The 
applicable Australian Corporation Law, s.221 permitted sole directorship (Spender, 2000: 
40). The overall effect was that “[a]lthough the legal entities who contracted with the 
employees did not change, the nature of the business and the viability of those companies 
had changed fundamentally” (Spender, 2000: 41). The workers’ union instituted an action 
against the corporate group (Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores Operations 
No. 1 Pty Ltd (1998); Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of 
Australia (1998)). An interlocutory injunction was granted against the members of the 
corporate group by both the court of first instance and the appellate court compelling the 
companies to treat the four labour-supply companies as their sole suppliers of labour. The 
companies were also required to treat the labour supply agreements as subsisting and valid 
(Spender, 2000: 55).  However, the litigation ended at the interlocutory stage when the 
parties reached settlement. The terms of settlement included the winding-up of the four 
labour-supply companies; the transfer of the workers’ employment to the group holding 
company; and the termination of the labour supply contracts (Spender: 55).  In England 
today, it would not be possible for the kind of restructuring carried out by the Patrick group to 
dispense with the services of the employees of the four associated companies. The 
introduction of the concept of “associated employer” by section 231 of the Employment 
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Rights Act 1996 prevents such actions (Milman, 1999: 237).  According to that statutory 
provision, two employers are associated if “one is a company of which the other (directly or 
indirectly) has control, or both are companies of which a third person (directly or indirectly) 
has control”. This statutory provision is a clear case of disregard of the principle of 
independent existence of corporations. 
 
Examples of such control may also exist where the businesses belong to the same corporate 
group or there is a parent-subsidiary relationship. In Bowoto v Chevron the claimants sued 
Chevron (now ChevronTexaco) for human rights abuses and for issuing false and 
misleading information on its practices in Nigeria under a military regime. In March 2004, the 
US (federal) District Court in San Francisco, California, rejected Chevron’s arguments that 
(1) Nigeria is the proper forum for the trial of the case, (2) the alleged human rights abuses 
did not violate international law, and (3) Chevron could not be held responsible for the 
actions of its Nigerian subsidiary. In effect, in Bowoto v Chevron the court ruled that separate 
personality of a subsidiary corporation does not constitute a bar to holding a corporation 
accountable for the actions of their overseas subsidiaries.  The relevant control may also 
exist where, as in Cape Industries v Adams (1990), the corporation knew of the “risks” but 
took steps to establish an asset-free undertaking for the “risky” business.  In 1968, Cape 
Industries closed its main UK factory as a result of the concerns for and the prevalence of 
asbestos related disease, although its South African operations continued in such unsafe 
environment until 1979 (Meeran, 2000: 263).  The relevant South African and Namibian 
labour compensation laws provided only “a system of paltry compensation” and also 
precluded “claims against the employer” (Meeran, 2000: 252). 
 
Limitation of corporate liability is an issue of “compelling theoretical interest and practical 
importance” (Hohfeld, 1909: 320). The exception to our general proposition of limiting 
responsibility to direct suppliers is where there is evidence of actual control by one 
corporation over another in the supply-chain irrespective of their positions on the chain. 
Control may mean either “checking and supervising” or “determining-the-outcome” (Vagts, 
1980: 324). The first is control at the lower level while the second is a higher-level control. In 
this paper, we adopt the higher level of control as the relevant factor. First, the level of 
“determining-the-outcome” requires less inquiry of details than “checking” or “supervising”. 
Secondly, the usual relationship of firms is at that higher level, although it is possible for a 
firm to be involved in the details of the operations of another firm.  
 
“Determining-the-outcome” is connected to the setting and monitoring of a general policy 
framework. Being in a position to set or monitor such policies is as good as actually setting 
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or monitoring them. Where this control exists, the indication is that the relationship between 
the corporations is not a normal “arms-length” business relationship. Using control as the 
relevant factor for imposing responsibility has the distinct advantage of ensuring that a 
corporation does not avoid responsibility where such responsibility should be assumed. 
Otherwise, ‘careful’ supply-chain organisation may be capable of completely defeating the 
aims of CSR. Nothing prevents a corporation from establishing a supply-chain relationship, 
which ensures that the “risky” venture is carried out by an enterprise even lower than the 
direct supplier.  
 
 
Corporate Groups 
 
Corporations are generally permitted to own shares in other corporations. Corporate groups 
exist as a result of the ownership of shares by corporations in other corporations. The 
allocation of responsibility is one of the most controversial aspects of the law relating to 
corporate groups (Milma, 1999: 224). There is a growing trend towards a departure from the 
strict application of the principles of corporate personality and separate corporate existence 
in the context of corporate groups. This approach appears to have influenced some English 
statutory provisions on corporate groups (Littlewoods Mail Order Stores v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners (1969): 1241) such as consolidated accounts (Companies Act, 1985, s.227), 
disclosure requirements (Companies Act, 1985, ss.231, 232) and business report 
(Companies Act 1985 s.234 (as amended by Part 1 of Company (Audit Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act 2004). Why should this legal approach not be extended to 
corporate social responsibility?  
 
We advocate a single enterprise view of corporate groups. Single enterprise is an approach 
that treats the members of a corporate group as the same corporation. This approach 
reflects the actual and commercial reality of and in the operations of corporate groups. A 
suggestion has rightly been made for responsibility where “there is sufficient involvement in, 
control over and knowledge of the subsidiary operations” (Meeran, 2000: 261). It appears 
that the trend is for corporations to be willing to argue in favour of separate companies as 
constituting a single economic unit whenever this may confer a perceived benefit, including 
right of action (an argument that was rejected by the court in The Albazero (1977)), profit or 
tax or other fiscal incentives (for instance, in ICI v Colmer (1998) and Bosal Holding BV 
(2003). However, there appears to be a change in corporate attitude when social 
responsibility is in issue. For instance, in Bhopal Case (1986, 1987), the defendant parent 
company disputed the argument of both the Indian government and the claimants that the 
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parent was liable for the environmental disaster in issue regardless of the apparent legal 
separation between the parent and its Indian subsidiary. 
 
It is important to recognize corporate groups as “a form of business organisation sui generic” 
(Milman, 2000: 219). One should not be oblivious of the fact that some corporations are 
“mere instrumentalities” (Amoco Cadiz (1984): 338) of other enterprises. There is no need to 
insist on the separate legal existence of the individual corporations in a corporate group. 
Such insistence on independent existence of the individual companies is certainly “not a true 
reflection of the economic reality [since] very often such groups are so intertwined with each 
other’s affairs as to amount to little more than departments of one organisation or entity”  
(McGee, Williams and  Scanlan, 2005: 105). Artificialities are encouraged where the legal 
principle of separate existence is applied to corporate groups. For example, it is definitely not 
“the most honest way” of doing business where there is “the creation or purchase of a 
subsidiary with minimal liability which will operate with the parent’s funds and on the parent’s 
directions but not expose the parent to liability” (Atlas Maritime Co. v Avalon Maritime Ltd 
(No 1), (1991): 779). In most cases of parent-subsidiary relationship, evidence shows that 
“subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent company and must do just what the 
parent company says”( DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 
(1976): 860). The fact is that most historical accounts, (for instance, Hovekamp, 1991: 49-
54) of the principle of separate existence of corporations strongly indicate that the principle 
was designed for the protection and encouragement of the individual shareholder, and not 
the corporate shareholder. In our view, therefore, firms in a dominant or controlling position 
in a corporate group should also be responsible for the activities of other firms in the group.  
 
 
Power and Influence 
 
A further probing into the different scenarios presented above resonate with what comes 
across as a common assumption that the more powerful in an economic relationship should 
bear the responsibilities of the weaker party (Reed, 1999). On one hand, firms are readily 
perceived as more powerful than their suppliers, and consequently expected to assume 
responsibility for the practices of their suppliers.  On the other hand, it is very plausible to 
conjecture that firms may also exert undue pressures on their suppliers thereby forcing them 
to conform to their low cost targets at the expense of responsible business practices. As 
such, a firm’s exercise of power over the supplier may have either a deontological or 
consequentialist outlook.  Firms that enforce principles of responsible business practice from 
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the standpoint of moral duty do so from a deontological perspective, while those that 
implement such principles in other to maximize profit do so from a consequentialist view 
point. Using the example of the suppliers of UK clothing retailers, Jones and Pollitt (1998) 
show that an opportunistic abuse of power by retailers can lead to reductions in quality, lack 
of investment, lack of innovation, and even job loses and industry decline (Crane and 
Matten, 2004).   
 
Considering the enormity of corporate multinational power, encouraging responsible 
practices within their business networks would still count as a moral minimum. Since firms 
(especially multinational corporations) wield a lot of power – given the vast resources 
available at their disposal, it is morally justifiable and more sensible to expect them to use 
their powers in a way that encourages suppliers to adhere to some reasonable standards of 
responsible practices. However, the responsible use of power applies to both the firm and 
the supplier given their relative power positions in the market (i.e. the powerful supplier – 
monopoly; and the powerful buyer - monopsony).  But this influence, we suggest, should be 
limited to the interface between the firms and their immediate suppliers. Our primary 
assumption here is that through ripple effects, the influence of the powerful firm will filter 
down the entire spectrum of the supply chain.  
 
 
Translating responsibility in supply chains into practice: some 
managerial suggestions 
 
The translation of responsibility in supply chains into practice will involve some sort of 
change management – as the status quo will be altered. Covey (1992) in his seminal book: 
The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People suggests that it is essential to make the distinction 
between circle of control and circle of influence in any change management initiative. The 
circle of control relates to things we have complete control over, while circle of influence 
relates to things we can seek to influence, but do not have total control over. Following our 
position that purchasing firms should not bear responsibilities for the actions of the suppliers 
and that firms in position of power should seek to positively, influence the practices of their 
suppliers, it implies that firms can only act within their circle of influence while dealing with 
their suppliers. Some of the possible ways of exerting this influence may include amongst 
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others: corporate codes of conduct/standards, corporate culture, anti-pressure group 
campaigns4 and personnel development. 
 
The codes of conduct/ standards will state in clear terms the value orientation of the 
purchasing firm and its expectations from the suppliers. This can be mapped out in 
consultation with the direct suppliers or as an agreement between firms and new suppliers at 
the point of engagement. This form of consultation should be free from any form of 
stakeholder imperialism - a relationship whereby the stakeholders are only accorded 
instrumental values, solely for economic gains. Stakeholder imperialism does not give a 
voice to stakeholders and is characterised by unilateral communication (Crane and Livesey, 
2003) and unequal balance of power. It is not genuine; it is selfish and firms involve in it 
because “… it makes good business sense … (and)… helps companies to mitigate risk, 
protect corporate brand, and gain competitive advantage… (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
2002:2 cited in Brown and Fraser, 2004).  Rather the consultation should be characterised 
by genuine intentions, dialogue, engagement, trust and fairness (Phillips, 1997; Swift, 2001).  
Firms engaging in this form of consultation understand that stakeholder-ship entails some 
form of intrinsic value. They enter into such a relationship for some ends that transcend the 
mere calculation and maximization of profits.  It will then be the responsibilities of these 
immediate suppliers to pass on to their subsequent suppliers down the supply chain, the 
culture of responsible business practice.  
 
The principal purchasing firm can as well institute a process that asks for periodic 
submission of ethical audit reports from the suppliers as part of the engagement and ensure 
that any supplier found guilty either by the auditors and or the public would be named and 
shamed, which might even lead to the severance of relationship. In the same line of thought, 
purchasing firms can set up some sort of rewards for suppliers that continually meet the 
standards. Commenting on the relevance of the code of conduct in socially responsible 
supply chain management, Graafland (2002:283) gives an account of how it is used in C&A: 
 
The code requires that suppliers respect the ethical standards of C&A in 
the context of their particular culture. Suppliers should have fair and 
honest dealings with all others with whom they do business, including 
employees, sub-contractors and other third parties. In addition to this 
general requirement, the code specifies detailed requirements related to 
employment conditions. For example, the use of child labour is absolutely 
unacceptable. Workers must not be younger than the legal minimum age 
and not less than 14 years. Wages must be comparable with local norms 
                                                 
4 The anti-pressure group campaign option is basically geared towards the global firms reclaiming power from the 
pressure groups and shifting public attention to the responsibilities of firms within their supply chains and the 
need for them to be held accountable for their practices as independent firms with legal and moral rights/duties. 
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and comply with local laws. Furthermore, the code requires that suppliers 
make full disclosure to C&A of all facts concerning production and the use 
of sub-contractors. The suppliers are obliged to authorise [the auditors] to 
make un-announced inspections of the manufacturing facility. 
 
According to Graafland, C&A (in the above example) severed relationships with suppliers 
that did not conform to the code.  
 
Another possible way for a powerful firm to positively influence less powerful firms in its 
network is to serve as a role model to others through its ethical organisational culture. 
According to McIntyre (1984), virtue is lived and not acted since one does not offer what one 
does not possess (nemo dat quod non habet). In this regard, Drumwright (1994) asserts that 
the success of socially responsible buying is to a large extent dependent on the 
organisational context within which the policies are made. In other words, to be able to 
influence the suppliers effectively the purchasing firm should exhibit high level of ethical 
orientation that is permeated in its culture. Culture is to an organisation what personality is to 
an individual. It is that distinctive formation of beliefs, values, work styles, and relationships 
(visible/invisible, said/unsaid) that distinguish one organisation from another (Schein, 
1985:9). But as there is abnormal personality there is also supposed to be bad 
organisational culture. But what determines a good or bad culture? In our opinion, a good 
organisational culture is one that embodies these ethical dimensions of virtue, rights, justice, 
and utilitarianism. The presence or absence of these ethical dimensions determines the 
organisation’s ability to base its decisions, policies, systems and processes on what is good 
and what is right (what ought to be) for its own sake (i.e. for the good of the society at large). 
This way, the purchasing firm will effectively serve as a role model to supplying firms for 
others to mimic. And theory confirms that firms have very high tendency to mimic each other, 
especially successful ones (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
 
A possible third option for a powerful firm to influence its supply chain is through personal 
training and value orientation. Crane and Matten (2004) distinguished two sets of ethical 
issues that arise in business-supplier relationship, viz. organisational level issues and 
individual level issues. At the organisational level are such issues as misuse of power, the 
question of loyalty, conflicts of interests and preferential treatments. At the individual levels 
are such issues as bribery, unethical negotiation and other personal factors. While some of 
the organisational issues can be addressed through the organisational culture, the individual 
level issues can be influenced through personnel training in ethics and values. The 
purchasing firm can go a step further to extend this sort of training programmes to the staff 
of their suppliers to in order to minimise the rate of value frictions at the point of transaction. 
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That way, both firm and suppliers will enjoy more lasting relationship and earn higher social 
capital base. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
With the emergence of post-nation state’s economic ideologies in the West under the 
auspices of globalization, the multinational dream of a deregulated global, economic space 
is becoming a reality. Hence, MNCs rival existing nation-states in the control of economic 
resources in the world. In this sense, MNCs are legitimate agents of justice and injustice, 
and hence liable to the same international principles governing economic and social 
corporations among states.  However, multinational corporations often operate under 
intricate economic, social and legal conditions within the territories of their subsidiary firms. 
Complex business laws and business structures differ from country to country, undermining 
the applicability of any emergent universal, moral-economic principles. These prevalent 
conditions, critics say, often allow multinationals the free moral space to maximize profits 
and trump existing ethical obligations.  
 
We acknowledge that the aim of the paper, as demonstrated, raises some moral issues. 
Some pertinent questions that keep resonating beyond our collective academic exercise, 
are: why limit the scope of responsibility of MNCs? Does limiting their scope of responsibility 
make CSR more effective along the supply chain or does it create a larger, free moral space 
for MNCs to perpetrate irresponsible acts? While these questions are important, it is not 
surprising that the global firms are currently under pressure more than ever to rescue their 
brands from cannibalisation due to possible irresponsible practices along their supply chain.  
The pressure groups understand this pressure and try to make the best use of it. It may not 
be surprising, also, to learn that sometimes, the pressure groups use these opportunities to 
promote their agenda (e.g. the case of Shell and Greenpeace is well documented in the 
business ethics literature5 .  
 
Although Emmelhainz and Adams (1999) argue that the shift towards global supply and 
competition comes with extended chain of responsibility on the part of individual firms, it will 
be theoretically inappropriate to hold any particular firm responsible for the practice of 
another firm; unless it is established that the action of one firm consequentially leads to the 
action of another particularly where the relationship is not at arms-length (e.g. through the 
                                                 
5 For example see: Bowie and Dunfee ( 2002) and Zyglidopoulos (2002). 
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concepts of control and corporate grouping as earlier discussed in the paper). However, 
since firms are rational and free entities, this consequential link of actions and 
responsibilities will be more sensible where there is an obvious misuse of power on either of 
the parties involved. If not, it is our opinion that each firm should bear responsibilities for its 
actions, albeit those in position of power have the deontological duty use power responsibly 
and the obligation to positively influence the weaker parties possibly by setting standards, 
serving as role models, anti-pressure group campaigns and through personnel training and 
value orientation. 
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